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The Strait Can Still Be Dangerous,
Despite the Easing of Tension
CHEN-SHEN J. YEN
Relations across the Taiwan Strait seem to have a life of their
own. Outside forces can define what cross-Strait relations should
be and the authorities on either side of the Strait may have their
own version, but still a dynamism exists that cannot be easily reined in or
tamed.
When President Chen Shui-bian (???) decided, for electoral
reasons, to hold a referendum on arms procurement along with the presi-
dential election of 2004, the move caused alarm to both Beijing and Wash-
ington. Even though the United States made clear its reservations about
such a dangerous move that might be seen as a unilateral change of the
status quo, Chen was determined to call attention to the missile threat from
China. He hoped that by so doing he would encourage the electorate to
vote for him rather than the opposition which would be seen as more likely
to take a conciliatory stance toward Beijing. This calculation and the failed
attempt on the president's life the day before the poll won him a razor-thin
victory in March 2004.
Chen's pan-Green (??) coalition was emboldened by this victory
and Chen subsequently called for the country's name to be changed and for
the adoption of a new constitution. Taiwan's electorate, however, refused
to give the pan-Green camp the legislative majority it needed to set the
agenda. Even though the opposition pan-Blue (??) coalition did not gain
any seats in the parliamentary election of December 2004, the slim major-
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ity it enjoyed was evidence enough that the pendulum was swinging in its
direction. Officials in Washington and those who do not want to see any
further change in the status quo across the Taiwan Strait breathed a sigh of
relief.
It was thought that Beijing's enactment of the "Anti-Secession Law"
in March 2005 would create new tensions across the Taiwan Strait and give
the pan-Green camp a new issue around which to rally support for per-
manent separation from China. These hopes were dashed when a senior
presidential advisor who was also a prominent businessman and famous
for his pro-independence stance reacted positively to the new law, mo-
tivated by a desire to protect his investments in China.
Once this gesture by a staunchly pro-independence elder statesman
had been accepted by the pan-Green camp, they could hardly object to
the subsequent visits to China by the pan-Blue leaders. The visits by the
three party chairmen (Lien Chan [??] of the Kuomintang [???],
James Soong [???] of the People First Party [???], and YuMu-ming
[???] of the New Party [??]) not only produced some concrete con-
cessions from Beijing (the abolition of tariffs on some Taiwan fruit, more
Chinese tourists allowed to visit Taiwan, local tuition rates for Taiwan
students studying on the mainland, etc.), but also substantially eased the
hostility between the two sides.
During the local election campaign at the end of 2005, when the
ruling party was beset by corruption scandals, President Chen again raised
the issue of independence, hoping it would get the pendulum swinging
back toward his pan-Green camp. Unfortunately, this strategy failed to
rally his supporters and the pan-Blue coalition won an overwhelming vic-
tory, claiming fourteen of the twenty-one contested county magistrate and
municipal seats, leaving pan-Green with only six (down from ten).
As Chen attempted to recover from the most embarrassing electoral
loss for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP,?????) in more than
a decade, the special budget for military procurement continued to be
stalled in the Legislative Yuan (???) and the Mainland Affairs Council
(???????) was facing a tough decision whether to allow the local
zoo to accept a gift of giant pandas from China. The two episodes are
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actually connected in a way that tends to be overlooked.
In essence, the atmosphere across the Taiwan Strait has been relative-
ly stable, if not relaxed, since the spring of 2005. The highly publicized
case of the pandas, cute and cuddly-looking as they are, could not but gen-
erate friendly feelings across the Strait. With such an unhostile atmosphere
prevailing, how could legislators justify the passage of a special budget
for arms procurement from the United States?
If, instead, there had been a heightening of tension across the Taiwan
Strait, it would have been much easier for the government to argue the case
for increasing defense capability. Passing the arms procurement budget
would not only act to a certain degree as a military deterrent to the Chinese,
but would also send Washington the message that Taiwan was determined
to shoulder responsibility for its own defense rather than relying solely on
the United States.
In fact, even President Chen himself seemed to heed U.S. advice
not to provoke Beijing by unilaterally changing the status quo across the
Taiwan Strait. Beijing has also learned not to rise to Chen's bait but rather
simply to ignore him.
If a year can make such a difference in cross-Strait relations at a
time when the "dangerous Strait" does not seem so very dangerous, one
might be tempted to ask whether the arguments and analyses contained in
Tucker's volume (published at the beginning of 2005) are still applicable
now. The answer is a definite yes.
The easing of tension has not fundamentally altered the fact that
Taiwan is still pursuing sovereignty. This is what the pan-Green has been
pursuing all along, and it would continue to be pursued even if the pan-Blue
coalition were to come to power. The indigenization process of the past
decade has given the people of Taiwan a separate identity that makes them
prefer the status quo over independence and to favor unification least of
all. Even with increasing economic integration between Taiwan and the
mainland and possible direct air links in the future, this separate identity is
here to stay.
The three chapters on the domestic sources of tension (by Rigger,
Bush, and Phillips) provide useful reminders of why, despite the apparent
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easing of tension across the Taiwan Strait in the second half of 2005, we
should never allow ourselves to be caught off guard. Cheng's argument in
his chapter that economic linkage does not lead to political ties has also
proved valid so far. Whether it will be refuted in the future, only time can
tell.
Should the pan-Green camp remain in power beyond 2008, the issues
of changing the country's name and enacting a new constitution will re-
main as genii in the bottle, ready to be released whenever the need arises.
The only problem is that once released, they may not easily be captured
again.
Finally, the chapters by Swaine, Chase, and Tucker are important
sources for students of this field and policymakers in Taiwan, the mainland,
and the United States. They will help them answer such persistent ques-
tions as whether, if Taiwan did opt for independence, it would have the
necessary defense capability to fend off an attack from China; what kinds
of arms procurements would be needed to convince the United States
that the island is serious about its own defense; and whether Washington
would come to Taiwan's aid should an attack take place.
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AWelcome Antidote to "National
Identity and Cross-Strait Fatigue"
DAFYDD FELL
To produce a volume that adds new perspectives on the complex
triangular relationship between Taiwan, the United States, and
the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a daunting challenge.
Over the last two decades a huge body of literature has been accumulated
addressing the role of Taiwan in U.S.-PRC relations, the impact of democ-
ratization and the economic rise of China on cross-Strait relations, and
the implications of growing Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism on the
two sides of the Taiwan Strait. It is not surprising that students of Taiwan
politics sometimes have complained to the reviewer of "national identity
and cross-Strait fatigue." Therefore, I highly commend the volume editor,
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, for assembling a fine collection of essays that
offers a unique and fresh contribution to the study of Taiwan's external
relations.
This review is limited to the first three empirical chapters: Shelley
Rigger, "The Unfinished Business of Taiwan's Democratization"; Steven
Phillips, "Building a Taiwanese Republic: The Independence Movement,
1945—Present"; and Richard Bush, "Lee Teng-hui [???] and 'Separa-
tism'." Taiwan's democratization, the Taiwan independence movement
(TIM), and the controversial figure Lee Teng-hui have all been the source
of countless academic and journalistic articles. Nevertheless, each of
these chapters represents an important contribution to the field of Taiwan
studies. First, the writers have all attempted to clear up some common
?
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myths or misunderstandings regarding their subject matters. Second, they
all use rich historical evidence to explain contemporary political de-
velopments of the Chen Shui-bian (???) era. Third, they add to our
understanding of elite-mass linkage in Taiwanese politics, showing how
politicians, though they are attempting to guide public opinion, are often
constrained or even led by public opinion. Lastly, though these chapters
are addressing questions that have been debated for decades, each has
offered new perspectives, new data, and new thinking on critical issues
for Taiwan's future.
Rigger's chapter on Taiwan's unfinished democratization continues
where she left off in her highly influential volume, Politics in Taiwan.1 In
Politics in Taiwan, Rigger listed the continuing challenges for Taiwan's
democracy as being: (1) transforming political attitudes and behavior, (2)
balancing presidential and legislative power, (3) streamlining Taiwan's
administration, (4) reducing clientelism and corruption, (5) strengthening
political parties, and (6) the challenge of cross-Strait relations. Now,
Rigger shows how five years later, most of these challenges continue to
trouble Taiwan's political system. Comparing the tone of these two works,
it appears that the author has become more pessimistic over the prospects
for Taiwanese democracy.
Rigger employs a framework for testing the state of democratic con-
solidation suggested by Larry Diamond, examining the degree of demo-
cratic deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance.
Democratic deepening refers to "the efforts of a new democracy to become
more liberal: more respectful of citizens' rights, more accountable andmore
representative of public preferences and interests" (p. 22). Political insti-
tutionalization is taken as "routinized, recurrent, and predictable patterns of
political behavior" (p. 22). Regime performance is "the young democracy's
ability to provide public policy outcomes, both economic and political,
that citizens desire" (p. 23). This is a useful overarching way of judging
the strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan's democracy.
1Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London: Routledge, 1999).
ISSUES & STUDIES
258 December 2005
Rigger argues that "Taiwan's democracy has performed best on the
first of Diamond's three tasks, democratic deepening" (p. 23). In contrast,
she is highly critical of the state of political institutionalization and regime
performance. We see regular reference to the continuing challenges in the
section on Taiwan's weak political institutionalization. Much attention is
thus given to the consequences of the poorly thought-out constitutional re-
form of the 1990s and the problems of Taiwan's party system. The author
is correct in her analysis of the highly adversarial state of inter-party pol-
itics in the post-2000 period, particularly, when we compare this to the
trend toward political consensus for much of the 1990s. The lack of a clear
division of powers between the presidency, executive, and legislature
has also been at the heart of numerous political disputes, such as over the
Fourth Nuclear Power Station. Similarly, the willingness of leaders of both
political camps to resort to extralegal measures has also been damaging for
public confidence in democratic institutions and contributed to a rise in
political cynicism.
Nevertheless, in some areas, the author takes an overly negative view
on Taiwan's political institutionalization. For example, Rigger doubted the
chances of constitutional reform of the election system; however, this legis-
lation was passed in 2004 and approved by the National Assembly (??
??) in 2005. Thus in Taiwan's 2007 legislative elections there will be a
halving of the number of legislators and a new single-member two-vote
electoral system. It looks probable that these reforms will contribute to
strengthening political parties. Another area of political institutionalization
in which I take issue with the author regards the party system in Taiwan.
Compared to the other established democracies in East Asia, such as Japan
and South Korea, Taiwan's party system shows much greater stability. The
major political parties in the island's first multiparty election in 1986 were
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, ?????) and Kuomintang
(KMT,???), and almost twenty years later, these two parties continue
to dominate electoral competition. Moreover, in the post-2000 period,
parties appear to be stronger than ever. For instance, despite the independ-
ent nature of many Taiwanese legislators, the degree of party discipline is
higher in the post-2000 period than in the Lee era. It is true that Taiwanese
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politicians do have a propensity for putting on a show (??, zuoxiu) to gain
media attention. However, the flamboyant nature of Taiwan's party politi-
cians does have certain advantages. Compared to the grey and dull nature
of electioneering in many mature democracies, the political theater of Tai-
wanese politicians has made politics more fun and accessible to voters,
contributing to both high levels of political knowledge and interest.
Rigger is also quite critical of regime performance in the post-2000
period. The impression of political gridlock produced by divided govern-
ment is prevalent in the contemporary Taiwanese media. However, when
historians come to assess the legislative record of the Chen Shui-bian era,
it will be seen that partisan consensus has actually been reached on a sur-
prising number of formerly controversial and divisive issues. Much im-
portant legislation has been passed to address the problems of political
corruption, such as the Political Donations Bill (?????) of 2004.2
The march toward gender equality has also continued; after a decade-long
struggle, feminist groups finally saw the Equal Employment Law (??
???) passed in 2002.3 After a decade of debate on pensions, universal
pensions were introduced in 2002. In 2001, all the parties were able to
reach a consensus at the Economic Development Conference (???) on
removing the "go slow, be patient" (????) restrictions on cross-Strait
trade and investment. Also, significant legislation has been passed to en-
hance workers' rights, such as recognizing the national-level federation of
independent unions and establishing unemployment insurance.4 Perhaps
most surprising of all were changes to the election system, including the
2003 Referendum Bill (?????). Finally, we must come to the actual
2See Christian Goebel, "Beheading the Hydra: Combating Political Corruption and Organ-
ised Crime in the KMT and DPP Eras," in Taiwan's KMT and DPP Eras in Comparative
Perspective, ed. Chang Bi-yu, Dafydd Fell, and Henning Klöter (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz,
2006).
3Dafydd Fell and Weng Hui-chen, "The Rootless Movement: Taiwan's Women's Movement
in the KMT and DPP Eras," in Chang, Fell, and Klöter, Taiwan's KMT and DPP Eras in
Comparative Perspective.
4See Ho Ming-sho, "Neocentrist Labour Policy in Practice: The DPP and the Taiwanese




phenomenon of divided government itself. Divided government tends to
get a very bad press in Taiwan. However, based on Taiwan's divisions in
party support, divided government serves as a critical check and balance to
both political camps. For when neither party can unilaterally impose their
policy will on the other, the parties are forced to seek consensus. We should
be more concerned over the future scenario where one camp controls all
three branches of government, as if the wishes of one camp are ignored,
political alienation of a large proportion of the electorate is highly likely.
Despite the above reservations, Rigger's chapter is a very timely con-
tribution to the debate over the state of Taiwan's democracy in the post-
2000 era. Her incisive analysis of the weaknesses in the institutional
structure of Taiwanese governance deserves the attention not only of fellow
academics but also of the party leaders on the island. Rigger is right in
arguing that Taiwan's democracy will not become truly consolidated as a
result of different presidents or ruling parties coming to power; the crux lies
in creating a consensus over the correct adjustments to Taiwan's political
institutions. The constitutional reforms of 2005 show that real reform is
possible; however, there appear to be few signs that agreement can be
reached over the next stage of reforms.
Steven Phillips' chapter on the historical and contemporary develop-
ment of the TIM differs from most previous work on this subject. Publi-
cations have tended to focus either on the exiled TIM during the martial
law era or on the Taiwan independence advocacy of the DPP. In contrast,
Phillips is able to bridge the gap between the two by not only showing how
the TIM in exile developed its organizations, repertoire of actions, and
ideology, but also how the movement adjusted to returning to Taiwan
and the newly liberalized political environment of the Lee Teng-hui era.
Despite their grandiose titles, such as the Provisional Government for
the Republic of Taiwan (?????????) and the World United
Formosans for Independence (????????), the exiled TIM had
very little direct impact on political developments in Taiwan in the au-
thoritarian era. Phillips shows how the movement became more influen-
tial after the island's political liberalization allowed the exiled leaders and
their organizations to operate freely in Taiwan.
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The reception the TIM received on its return to Taiwan was not as
welcoming as many exiles had imagined. The TIM has made only very
slow progress in convincing the Taiwanese electorate of the virtues of de
jure Taiwan independence. The TIM leaders were not treated as returning
heroes by most Taiwanese or even by the DPP. A key example was the
failed presidential election bid of the TIM figure Peng Ming-min (???)
in 1996. Phillips shows that it is incorrect to equate the DPP with the TIM,
for even at the time the DPP was established, Taiwan independence was
just one of a range of political issues prominent in the party policy platform.
The process of contesting elections forced the returning exiles to com-
promise. The DPP was only able to expand its support base by espousing
a more moderate form of Taiwan independence and combining this with
alternative appeals, on such issues as social welfare, political corruption,
and environmental protection.
Nevertheless, despite the divided and chaotic nature of much of the
TIM, they have been remarkably successful at achieving many of their ob-
jectives both in the Lee Teng-hui era and since the change of ruling party.
Education and cultural policy has been Taiwanized, the KMT has lost na-
tional power, referendum legislation has been passed, and unification has
become a political taboo. This success is summed up by a comment made
to the reviewer by DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui (???) in 2001:
In my view the Taiwan independence movement is basically like a hire pur-
chase; I mean that you have already had the first, second, and third payments.
The remaining payment is international recognition, and even now we are not
completely unrecognized, now is an incomplete recognition.... The point is that
once most of the goals have been achieved, why continue focusing on the ques-
tion? I cannot just make a speech shouting "Taiwan independence!" "Taiwan
independence!" all the way through for ten minutes, then come off the stage.5
The third chapter reviewed is Richard Bush's analysis of Lee Teng-
hui's record of statements on cross-Strait relations during his presidency.
The highly polarized views of Lee make a balanced approach to this con-
troversial figure all the more challenging. To some on the island, Lee has
5Lin Cho-shui, interview by reviewer, Taipei, September 24, 2001.
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been deified to the degree that he has replaced Sun Yat-sen (???) as the
father of the nation. In contrast, both the PRC and many on the pan-Blue
(??) side of politics view Lee as a traitor. In interviews with Taiwanese
politicians, it was common to hear that Lee had always had a long-term
plot for Taiwan independence. As early as 1994 he had been accused of
having a timetable for Taiwan independence.6
The Bush chapter takes a refreshingly different approach. Although
Bush shows the changing tone of Lee's statements, he also shows how Lee
maintained a high degree of consistency on core principles throughout his
presidency. The three areas of consistency that Bush argues Lee held to
were: "within the context of a unified China, the governing authorities in
Taipei possessed sovereignty and were essentially equal to the government
in Beijing; Taipei had the right to play a significant role in the international
community; and Beijing's growing military capabilities and its refusal to
renounce their use were an obstacle to reconciliation" (p. 90).
Bush convincingly challenges the PRC view that Lee was already a
separatist early in his presidency. Instead, Lee (like many DPP politicians)
was not opposed to unification per se, but opposed to unification under
the PRC's "one country, two systems" (????). We should recall
that during Lee's presidency the Guidelines for National Unification (??
????) were passed; Lee chaired the National Unification Council (?
??????); and in 1999, Lee explained that even the "special state-to-
state relationship" (???????) concept came under the Guidelines
for National Unification. A comment that Lee made to the reviewer as
late as 2001 backs up Bush's interpretation: "The ROC is a country, there
is no need to talk of independence. What matters is identifying with Tai-
wan. It is enough to localize and democratize. The DPP are fools, always
talking about Taiwan independence, we do not need to discuss Taiwan
independence."7
6New Party (??) candidate, Chao Shaw-kong (???), made this accusation in the tele-
vised debate for the Taipei mayoral election in 1994.
7Lee Teng-hui, interview by reviewer, Taipei, October 16, 2001.
Book Review
December 2005 263
The final important conclusion that Bush makes is to remind the
reader that "Lee was right in the mainstream of Taiwan views in the 1990s
on how to approach cross-Strait relations" (p. 91). Initiatives taken by Lee
such as the bid to rejoin the United Nations, vacation diplomacy, pragmatic
diplomacy, the 1998 concept of everyone being "New Taiwanese," and
even the "special state-to-state relationship" were all highly popular with
the general public. In politics we can never be certain if the politicians are
following public opinion or vice versa. Nevertheless, both election results
and public opinion surveys from the 1990s show that Lee's middle-of-
the-road approach to Taiwan's external relations was well-supported. In
a democratic context, Lee's cross-Strait positioning was entirely rational.
If Lee had taken a more defeatist or rapid unification stance in the 1990s,
it is quite likely that Taiwan's electorate would have punished the KMT in
the same way as it would treat the New Party after 2000.
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Traversing the Dangerous Waters
GANG LIN
This admirably coherent volume contains eight fine essays that
share new thinking and interpretations of an old and daunting
predicament across the Taiwan Strait. As Nancy Bernkopf
Tucker, the editor, puts it in the Introduction, "each of these essays has in
one way or another challenged existing views of the alarming confrontation
in the Taiwan Strait and sought fresh understandings of the dynamics in
Taiwan or among Taiwan, China, and the United States" (p. 15).
The three chapters following the Introduction explore the source of
the Taipei-Beijing-Washington crisis mainly from the perspective of Tai-
wan's domestic politics. Shelley Rigger's chapter addresses the frustrating
stalemate in Taiwan's journey toward democracy and raises a perplexing
question as to how long Taiwan can enjoy the luxury of its domestic po-
litical disarray given the pressing security problems that the island faces.
Rigger maintains that Chen Shui-bian's (???) political need to court the
fundamentalists and his frustration with Beijing's unresponsiveness to his
friendly gesture account for his provocative remarks about "one country
on each side of the Strait" (????????) in August 2002. Richard
Bush's chapter challenges the conventional view that sees Lee Teng-hui
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(???) as a man seeking independence, and contends that Lee as pres-
ident was not opposed to unification, but rather objected to the specific
kind of unification that Beijing was proposing. According to Bush, Bei-
jing's determination to define Lee's views as "splittist" has made the Strait
even more dangerous. Steven Phillips' essay argues that although Taiwan's
independence movement continues to be a "disorderly, faction-ridden
nationalist coalition lacking international support," it has contributed to a
quickening of Taiwanization—in language, history, culture, and symbols—
to distinguish the island from China (p. 68).
Few on the mainland, however, would agree that Lee Teng-hui really
wanted to accept reunification or that Chen Shui-bian's "one country on
each side of the Strait" was partly attributable to Beijing's cold shouldering
his initial conciliatory gesture. While many people on the Chinese main-
land have recognized a growing trend toward Taiwanization and even
independence on the island, they would attribute such a development to
Lee's and Chen's persistent pushing for Taiwan's independence over the
past decades. From the Chinese perspective, declaring Taiwan's inde-
pendence (??, taidu) and insisting on Taiwan's independent sovereignty
(??, dutai) are simply two sides of the same coin. Geopolitical asymme-
try between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, in addition to the historical
legacy of and political preference for a unitary state, rather than federation
or confederation, has made it extremely difficult for both political elites and
ordinary people on the mainland to accept a loosely integrated one-China
framework that would treat the mainland and Taiwan as two really equiv-
alent political entities. According to this mentality, China's reunification
is considered as an end of extending the scope of the current unitary state,
rather than a gradual process of political integration starting from con-
federation or federation. Also, given China's political system and political
culture, mainlanders tend to believe that political elites can fundamentally
shape and lead public opinion, rather than be controlled by it. Such a
"mirror image" was associated with a great effort on the mainland to figure
out the exact inner mind-set of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian regarding
Taiwan's future when they first came to power. From the same mirror
image, many on the mainland believe that Taiwanese perceptions of their
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relations with the mainland can be reshaped if Beijing adopts favorable
policies toward the Taiwanese people and if the pan-Blue (??) takes
power back from the pro-independence pan-Green (??) after the 2008
election.
The last four chapters, contributed by T. J. Cheng, Michael D.
Swaine, Michael S. Chase, and the editor herself, examine the "dangerous
Strait" from the perspective of relations among the three parties, concen-
trating on the security issue, which is also the focus of this review essay.
T. J. Cheng discusses the growing economic linkage between the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait, and claims that the process of economic ex-
change should not be called "integration," which would assume "a goal-
driven process that nation-states legally commit to and consciously pro-
mote" (p. 94). That condition does not exist between Taiwan and the
People's Republic of China (PRC), he contends. Cheng also argues that
asymmetric economic interdependence does not seem to give Beijing
leverage to coerce Taipei, nor does it necessarily turn Taiwan businessmen
into a pro-unification force. While recognizing the danger of the "hollow-
ing out" of Taiwan's economy in the future, resulting from increasing Tai-
wanese investment in the mainland, he believes the immediate hazard has
so far been avoided thanks to Taipei's careful management.
Cheng's argument challenges the conventional wisdom informed by
functionalism that expects closer economic exchange to bring about closer
political relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait sooner or later.
Cheng is perfectly right to point out that Taipei does not consciously pro-
mote a goal-driven process of economic integrationwith the mainland, not
to mention political integration. However, Beijing does consider economic
exchanges across the Taiwan Strait as a way of promoting political reuni-
fication. In other words, Taipei's political effort to slow down economic
exchange with the mainland is counterbalanced by Beijing's determination
to promote political unification through economic integration. Such a
clash of political will between the two sides has made it difficult to define
cross-Strait economic relations as integration or not. Moreover, Taipei's
political will is continuously challenged by the Taiwanese business com-
munity which has developed various ways to escape from Taipei's regula-
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tions and intervention. While Taiwanese businesspeople with stakes on the
mainland do not necessarily support China's reunification, they are clearly
in favor of closer associations with the mainland. Although the business
community on Taiwan is not strong enough to create "civilian governance"
of economic relations with the mainland, public opinion does present a
challenge to Taipei's autonomy in managing cross-Strait affairs based on
its political will and security concerns.
Michael Swaine's chapter shifts readers' attention from Taiwan's eco-
nomic security to military security by analyzing the objectives, achieve-
ments, and obstacles of military reform on the island. Taipei's goal is to
revolutionize its defense capabilities, remedy the shortfalls, and cope with
Beijing's accelerating military transformation. This demands the conver-
sion of a party army into a national defense force and the acceptance of
civilian control and the oversight of the Legislative Yuan (???). Swaine
observes that the quality of Taiwan's armed forces has increased in recent
years, but serious problems remain in coordination, communication, inte-
gration, and planning among Taiwan's fighting units. With the mutual
suspicion that exists among the Chen administration, the Legislative Yuan,
and the military, improvements in the millitary's hardware capabilities
and software infrastructure are highly dependent on the vagaries of U.S.
support and assistance. This does not suggest a bright prospect for Tai-
wan's defense reform.
Michael Chase explores U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation that has
developed to an extraordinary degree in recent years. By detailing the
dialogue and the large number of projects and training ventures that engage
Taiwan with the United States in improving the island's military software
capabilities, Chase argues that the common view of a largely isolated
Taiwan military is greatly outdated. However, he highlights emerging dif-
ferences between Washington and Taipei over weapons procurement and
threat perceptions, which result from conflicting assessments of the per-
formance and appropriateness of specific weapons and the pricing policies
of the United States as well as disparate estimates of whether Beijing will
attack Taiwan. As Chase points out, officials in Taiwan resent what they
characterize as the overbearing behavior of their American interlocutors,
ISSUES & STUDIES
268 December 2005
and the Americans believe that Taipei is too indecisive and unrealistic.
Taipei's underestimate of the dangerous Strait is associated with its
confidence in possessing a U.S. deterrent in a possible crisis. This brings
us to a debatable issue as to whether Washington must clarify its position
in order to avoid a military conflict. Nancy Tucker, however, argues in
the last chapter that Washington should maintain its traditional policy of
strategic ambiguity. Her major reason is that no one can predict all possible
contingencies, and that by attempting to define what the United States will
do under specific circumstances, policymakers will encourage probing and
limit their options in a complex crisis. Since American domestic politics,
as much as circumstances in the Strait, will determine Washington's reac-
tion to the crisis, no president will want to be constrained by decisions
made in the past. Similarly, the U.S. military establishment will want to
be free to utilize force in the national interest during a possible war.
The unpredictability of U.S. reaction toward a possible war in the Tai-
wan Strait, while giving Washington a freer hand in crisis management,
may not work as well as "strategic clarity" in preventing the outbreak of
the war. The more likely it is that a military conflict will occur between
the mainland and Taiwan and will involve the United States, the more vital
it is that Washington should prevent misperceptions of its possible reac-
tion by either side. Indeed, since the 1995-96 Strait crisis Washington has
increased its military ties with Taipei while making it clear that the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan's security is not a blank check that can be cashed by
Taipei under any circumstances. In other words, Washington has adopted
a clearer strategy of double deterrent to discourage Beijing's use of arms
against Taiwan and Taipei's movement toward de jure independence. This
was reflected in President GeorgeW. Bush's December 2003 remarks about
opposing any unilateral change of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait
when he met PRC Premier Wen Jiabao (???). While Beijing is un-
happy with U.S.-Taiwan military and political connections, it may consider
a U.S. policy of "strategic clarity" as the second-worst choice, which would
work better than "strategic ambiguity" in deterring Taipei's unilateral
change of the status quo. Also, strategic clarity may be welcomed by Tai-
wan's opposition parties who do not want to endorse the ruling party's
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risky strategy of seeking independence and provoking Beijing.
This book offers useful insights and fresh ideas on the complex and
dynamic relationships among Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. It is worth
considering as a textbook for graduate courses in Asia-Pacific security
and cooperation, as well as in U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations. Experts in the
related areas may also find this volume useful and thought-provoking.
Most scholars and experts in mainland China, however, may argue that
this volume should have accommodated the Chinese perspective regarding
the danger of the Strait—its fundamental roots, exacerbating factors, and
possible ways out of the crisis. Many on the mainland, furthermore, would
perceive closer economic links between the two sides as an antidote to
Taiwan's independence, and consider U.S. military cooperation with Tai-
wan as sending encouraging message to the "separatists" on the island.
From the PRC's viewpoint, the easiest way to resolve the troublesome
Taiwan issue is for the United States to reduce arms sales to Taiwan, and
encourage cross-Strait economic exchange and political negotiation. One
may contend that the substantial influence of the United States could go
beyond the military perspective introduced in this volume. Nevertheless,
it is Beijing and Taipei that have greater stakes in preventing a possible war
between them. Increasing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will not sufficiently
enhance Taiwan's security nor will the PRC's missile deployment in Fujian
Province (???) adequately deter Taipei's risky strategy. While an un-
expected war might disrupt the PRC's "twenty-year opportunity period for
development," it could carry even worse implications for Taiwan's future.
As the island cannot afford to move itself away from the dangerous Strait,
Taipei should at least avoid muddying the waters simply because of its ob-
session with domestic politics or its miscalculation of international trends.
Given Taiwan's geographical proximity to the mainland, both political
elites and the public on the island may have to choose to serve as a con-
structive linkage between Beijing and Washington, rather than relying on
the United States as well as Japan to hedge against a rising China.
